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The scope of monitoring activities on a network is not an easy task. Users constantly try to retrieve 
information and documents while hackers try every minute to gain access. Protection, being the key-
word, is what is needed in both private and public networks to safeguard relevant information from 
being stolen or misused because no network is truly or completely safe. This project is about modern 
Network Security using CheckPoint as against Access Control List (ACL). The research focuses more 
on devices embedded on WAN and used in many network scenarios, including implementation using 
CheckPoint security. 
 
ACLs are used to filter traffic in parts of the network by denying or allowing flow of traffic to and from 
these parts. The list has an entry for each system user with access privileges. This is useful as a means 
of security from both internal and external attacks. Modern networks require a more dependable form 
of data security. 
 
The research will focus on Check Point as a modern security tool, which makes use of Stateful inspec-
tion firewall system. Comparisons will be made on the benefits of depending solely on packet filtering 
and the combination of both stateful inspection and packet filtering in today’s firewall architecture 
deployment in large and small companies.  
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 CONCEPT DEFINITIONS 
 
Advanced Encryption Standard -128 bit key (AES-128): An advanced encryption stand-
ard containing 128-bit key size. 
 
Advanced Encryption Standard -256 bit key (AES-256): An advanced encryption stand-
ard containing 256-bit key size. 
 
Demilitarized zone (DMZ): In computer security, a DMZ or demilitarized zone (sometimes 
referred to as a perimeter network) is a physical or logical subnetwork that contains and 
exposes an organization's external-facing services to a larger and untrusted network, usually 
the Internet. 
 
Graphical User Interface (GUI): A means of interacting with a desktop environment like 
windows operating systems and statistical software such as JMP, a software for analyzing 
statistical data. 
 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS): This is a secure version of HTTP, which 
is a safe protocol for communication over a network. It also means data transfer between a 
user and an accessed website is encrypted. 
 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP): A protocol used by network devices to send 
error messages.  
 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE): A protocol used to set up a security association (SA) in the 
IPsec protocol suite. 
 
Internet Protocol (IP): The method or protocol by which data is sent from one computer to 
another on the Internet through unique identifiers called addresses by different computers. 
 
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP): A protocol 
for establishing Security Associations (SA) and cryptographic keys in an Internet environ-
ment. 
 
  
Internet Service Provider (ISP): An organization that provides access to the internet, often 
times for a fee. 
 
Local Area Network (LAN): A computer network that covers a relatively small area. 
 
Network Interface Cards (NIC): This is a circuit board or card that is installed on a com-
puter in order to allow it connect to a network. 
 
Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model): A model, which describes how appli-
cations can communicate over a network. 
 
Telecommunication Service Priority (TSP): A program that approves national security 
and crisis ready organizations to get needed treatment for critical voice and data circuits or 
related telecommunications services. 
 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP): A network communication protocol designed to 
send data packets over the Internet. 
 
Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES): Triple Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a 
type of computerized cryptography where block cipher algorithms are applied three times to 
each data block. 
 
Wide Area Network (WAN): A computer network that covers a large area. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The globalization of the internet has precipitated the need for a more effective and reliable 
security infrastructure. Organizations and businesses are more dependent on the internet as 
vaults for private data and information. Just as there is an increase in this regard, security 
breaches also are on the increase. The common excuse for breaches, when they occur, is that 
some security defense mechanism somehow fails to provide the needed prevention from 
intrusion. 
 
Today, many businesses and organizations still depend on packet filtering. This is a way of 
controlling access to a network by analyzing incoming and outgoing packets. It is achieved 
by filtering them based on the IP addresses of their sources and destinations. Without a fire-
wall, a network is open to anyone connected through a private or public network. A wide 
area network is a network that exists within a large geographical area. A Telecommunication 
Service Provider (TSP) interconnects LANs at their different locations. The providers man-
age large area networks that can span long distances.  TSPs transports voice and data com-
munications on separate networks. Those networks that connect LANs in geographically 
separated locations are referred to as Wide Area Networks (WANs). The need to secure a 
wide area network can be aided and achieved with Checkpoint, a modern security software 
that uses Stateful inspection by gathering, storing and manipulating traffic relevant to all 
communication layers and other applications. 
 
This thesis aims to look into the types of threats individuals, organizations and institutions 
face while using the network as a form of information and data transfer medium. To guar-
antee a safe working environment for users, an effective mode of network security must be 
put in place. Access control lists as a firewall solution will be analyzed in relation to large 
networks and organizations. The period and length of the list in relation to how it translates 
into more workload for the routers main CPU, will also be analyzed.  
 
The use of Check Point as a tool for effective network security will be looked into concerning 
large and small organizations. Its use of Stateful inspection will be discussed. Its architec-
ture, firewall modes and relevant component tools will also be analyzed alongside their 
proper installation procedures. 
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2 SECURITY    
 
Threat level is based on two critical elements, which are the potential impact of the security 
violation on functional operations (severity of the hazard) and the probability that the viola-
tion will occur. The severity of the risk is classified into four categories: Critical, Severe, 
Moderate, and Low. The probability ranking is also categorized as Frequent, Probable, Oc-
casional, and Possible.  
 
Critical is the exploitation of the vulnerability, which would result in a total system compro-
mise, which may include complete loss of management control and/or use of the compro-
mised system to launch attacks or intrusions against other companies. In addition to direct 
costs, there may be significant indirect financial loss, due in part to litigation or damaged 
reputation. An example of vulnerabilities of this nature would be installation of remote con-
trol software that would permit a remote intruder full access to the machine. (Danielyan & 
Knipp 2002, 63-64.) 
 
Severe implies the exploitation of the vulnerability would result in a partial system compro-
mise, potentially losing control over a delivered service or prompting unauthorized distribu-
tion of sensitive information. The primary impact of this sort of vulnerability is the direct 
cost associated with loss of service or information. An example of vulnerabilities of this 
nature would be a weakness in Web server configuration that allowed for Web page deface-
ment. (Danielyan 2002, 63-64.) 
 
Moderate describes when exploitation of the vulnerability would result in degraded perfor-
mance and loss of system integrity. Primary impact of this sort of vulnerability is the indirect 
cost associated with event normalization. An example of vulnerabilities of this nature would 
be a server subject to a Denial of Service attack. (Danielyan 2002, 63-64.) 
 
Low is considered when exploitation of the vulnerability results in degraded performance 
without loss of integrity, or which prompts an inability to control integrity in a functioning 
host. The primary impact of this sort of vulnerability is the indirect cost associated with 
higher maintenance. An example of vulnerabilities of this nature would be user-controlled 
desktops. (Danielyan 2002, 63-64.) 
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The level of probability for the aforementioned include frequent, which is the probability of 
the event happening again. This might occur if the vulnerability has been widely publicized, 
automated tools are available, or if a worm, using the exploit is available. The probability 
level, which is considered probable, is when the event is likely to happen several times dur-
ing the life cycle of the host system. This might occur because the vulnerability is well 
known, but “user friendly” exploit tools are not available, and thus require a higher level of 
skill to compromise the system. Likewise, occasional level implies the event is likely to 
occur again sometime during the host system’s life cycle. This would occur when the vul-
nerability is not well known, or when specific circumstances would be required for a breach 
(such as a maintenance window when certain protections are not in place). Finally, possibil-
ity level is when it is unlikely but possible to occur in the system’s lifecycle. A classification 
may be such when the vulnerability is of a theoretical nature and no exploit code is known, 
or specific circumstances of low probability are required, or when the vulnerability is of a 
theoretical nature whereby no methods exits to exploit the vulnerability as it is currently 
known. (Danielyan 2002, 63-64.) 
 
2.1 Attacks 
 
Due to the ever-increasing expansion of the internet, many organizations are fully focused 
on providing protection against attackers, which can be both internal and external. Various 
information security studies have found that the majority of attacks actually come from in-
side the organization. The internal threat can include authorized users attempting to exceed 
their permissions or unauthorized users trying to go where they should not be at all. The 
insider is potentially more dangerous than the outsider is because they have level of access 
than the outsider. (Vitaly 2002, 8.) 
 
According to Lammle (2014), the most common forms of attacks are in the category of  
Application-layer attacks, which is a kind of denial of service attack achieved by attacking 
the OSI model. The assault creates more activities in particular functions or components of 
a site with the aim to cripple those capacities or features. Also described is Auto-rooters, 
which is a toolkit made by hackers to infiltrate particular shortcomings in PCs particularly 
with most recent point and click PC users. (Sumit  & Elliot. 2011.). Another form of attack 
is the Backdoor attack, which refers to a situation where access can be gained to a network 
in order to create pathway through a programme for easy access by hackers. (Emmet 2011, 
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150.) Similarly, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 
works by flooding and creating more workload in network resources in order to meddle with 
typical operations of network administrations, depleting and overpowering the assets of the 
focused on system.  A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack occurs when different 
systems surge the data transmission on a focused system, generally one or more web servers. 
Such an assault is regularly the aftereffect of different compromised multiple systems (for 
instance a botnet) flooding the focused system with activity. (Ghorbani, Wei, & Tavallaee 
2009, 11.) 
 
Tribe Flood Network (TFN) and Tribe Flood Network 2000 (TFN2K) are sets of computer 
program aimed at conducting various DDoS attacks like ICMP, SYN, UDP floods including 
Smurf attacks. TFN2K is a device allowing clients to exploit others' resources to facilitate a 
cyber-attack against one or numerous objectives, bringing about a Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DDoS) attack. It is made of two components namely a user-controllable interactive 
client program on the master and a server process operating on an agent. (Lammle 2014.) 
 
Other examples such as Stacheldraht, IP spoofing, Man-in-the-middle attacks, Network re-
connaissance, Packet sniffers, Password attacks, Brute-force attack, Port redirection attacks, 
Trojan horse attacks and viruses and Trust exploitation attacks, according to Lammle (2014), 
are classified under Reconnaissance, Access and DoS attacks. Reconnaissance attacks in-
volves Hackers attempting to discover vulnerable systems in order to gather information. In 
most cases, these attacks are used to gather information to set up an access or a DoS attack. 
A typical reconnaissance attack might consist of a hacker pinging IP addresses to discover 
what is alive on a network. The hacker might then perform a port scan on the systems to see 
which applications are running as well as to determine the operating system and version on 
a target machine. Access attacks involves one in which an intruder attempts to gain unau-
thorized access to a system to retrieve information. Sometimes the attacker needs to gain 
access to a system by cracking passwords or using an exploit. At other times, the attacker 
already has access to the system but needs to escalate his or her privileges. DoS attacks are 
used by Hackers to disable or corrupt access to networks, systems, or services. The intent is 
to deny authorized or valid users access to these resources. DoS attacks typically involve 
running a script or a tool, and the attacker does not require access to the target system, only 
a means to reach it. In a distributed DoS (DDoS) attack, the source consists of many com-
puters that are usually spread across a large geographic boundary. (Vitaly 2002, 8.) 
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2.2 Firewall Solutions 
 
Access Control Lists as a Firewall Solution is a list containing access control entries, which 
identifies a user by allowing or denying access rights. Although ACLs does not serve the 
same purpose as a complete firewall, it serves majorly in controlling the IP network. Grout, 
Mcginn & Davies (2007), describe an access list, or Access Control List (ACL), as a se-
quence of rules designed to implement a given objective or set of objectives. ACLs can be 
used simply to pass or block packets or as filters for more sophisticated policies such as 
traffic shaping, address translation, queuing or encryption. 
 
ACLs consists of two types namely, Standard and Extended ACLs. Deepak & Prasad (2015), 
describe Standard ACLs as a simple IP ACL that filters based on source address only, that 
is, source network or source host. It cannot filter based on the destination of a packet wherein 
the protocol being used like Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Proto-
col (UDP), or on the port number.  
 
Deepak (2015) explains that for Extended ACLs, the list checks both the source and desti-
nation addresses. In addition, checks are carried out for specific protocols, port numbers and 
other parameters. They can also be used in enforcing network policies. Deepak. A packet 
may be matched against several ACLs on a single router and many on its complete journey 
from source to destination. A rule can consist of different parts such as permit or deny type, 
the protocol, source address, destination address and flag function. Colton (2002), gives a 
typical example in the syntax of the Cisco Internetwork Operating Systems (IOS) as follows:  
access-list 101 deny icmp any 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 
echo-reply  
This implies that the parameter above matches all source addresses whilst the 0.255.255.255 
parameter matches destination addresses in the 10.0.0.0 network. It states that the Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo-reply packets from any source to the 10.0.0.0 net-
work will be blocked. (Grout, McGinn & Davies 2007.) 
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The rules are processed one after the other. This means that each rule is tried against the first 
control rule. If it matches, it is passed. If not, it is blocked accordingly without further test. 
This is because there is a specific (deny all) rule at the end of each ACL. (Grout et al. 2007.)  
Cisco explicitly explains that traffic coming into a router is compared to entries in the ACL. 
This determines the action of the router, whether to keep looking until it finds a match or 
deny all after reaching the end of the list in the event there is no match. This means that there 
must be at least one permit entry in ACL, else all traffic is denied. (Cisco Systems, Inc. 
2007.)  According to Cisco Systems, Inc. (2007), Table 1 below correctly describes ACL 
commands and their functions. 
 
TABLE 1. ACL Commands and Functions (Cisco 2007). 
ACL Command Function 
 
 
 
 
access-list 101 permit ip 10.1.1.0 
0.0.0.255 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255 
This command permits IP traffic 
from 10.1.1.0 network to 172.16.1.0 
network. Any packet with a source 
address not in this range is rejected 
or denied. 
 
 
 
 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.1.0 
0.0.0.255 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255  
access-list 102 deny ip any any 
 
In this example, IP traffic from 
10.1.1.0 network is granted permis-
sion to network 172.16.1.0. Like-
wise, packets with a source address 
not in this range is denied. 
 
 
 
access-list 101 permit tcp host 10.1.1.2 
host 172.16.1.1 eq telnet 
 
For this example, the command per-
mits Telnet Traffic from machine 
10.1.1.2 to machine 172.16.1.1. 
 
 
 
access-list 101 permit tcp host 10.1.1.2 
host 172.16.1.1 
Here, the command is used to permit 
TCP Traffic from 10.1.1.2 host ma-
chine to 172.16.1.1 host machine. 
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access-list 101 permit udp host 10.1.1.2 
host 172.16.1.1 
 
In this example, the command per-
mits UDP Traffic from 10.1.1.2 host 
machine to 172.16.1.1 host ma-
chine. 
 
 
 
access-list 101 permit ip 10.1.1.0 
0.0.0.255 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255 
 
The command here permits IP Traf-
fic from 10.1.1.0 network to 
172.16.1.10 network. 
 
 
 
Access list statements are entered one line at a time and the list is scanned for a match in that 
same order. Once entered, the list must be associated with the interface on the router where 
filtering will occur. One can apply the list to incoming packets, (an "in" access list) or out-
going packets (an “out” access list). In most cases, either list will work. For out access lists, 
one needs to set up the filter only on the one outgoing interface rather than on the individual 
incoming interfaces.  This improves performance because only the network you are protect-
ing will force a lookup on the access list. (Morrissey 1998.)  
The time to process an ACL is then the total time taken to test a packet against each rule up 
to and including the one it matches. This brings to question the issue of performance. Router 
effectiveness is altered by access list filters despite Cisco’s inbuilt performance enhancing 
features. Features such as fast switching, autonomous switching, distributed switching and 
optimal switching is not utilized during packet filtering, hence forcing the packets to be pro-
cessed switched. The ultimate outcome of this effect creates a burden for the router’s main 
CPU. (Morrissey 1998.) 
 
Another problematic issue is the length of the access lists. The more the lists the more the 
work done by the router to process each packet. The solution to reduce this is to locate the 
most likely matches at the top of the list. This is achieved by placing a rule that allows all 
TCP established or ACK (acknowledged) packets. The following statements at the top of the 
access lists allows all established packets. 
 
access-list 101 permit tcp 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 
established 
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Access Control is an integral part of securing the network especially in WANs with lots of 
locations and systems. Data protection and packet filtering at this level reduces the success 
and manifestation of threats and attacks. Access controls at both the network and system 
level, are often not as strong as they should be. All users may share drives with read/write 
access. The typical user has a greater level of access than he or she needs to do a job. Tight-
ening up access controls can result in substantial improvements in a company’s security 
posture. Some technological solutions include firewalls, router access lists, and policy en-
forcement tools that validate and perhaps control file system access. (Vitaly 2002, 13.) 
 
A typical example for configuring a standard access list can be shown using a Routing In-
formation Protocol (RIP) topology as in Graph 1. The Packet Tracer, a cross platform simu-
lation tool, will be made use of in this instance. All that is needed at this point is the IP 
addresses of the hosts (PC5) and the subnet to permit or deny, relative to which direction. 
This is because standard ACLs filters traffic based on traffic coming from the source. 
  
In this case, an attempt will be made to block 10.0.0.3 from gaining access to 40.0.0.0 whilst 
being able to communicate with other networks. In addition, network 10.0.0.0 should be able 
to receive packets from 40.0.0.0. In order for our host to be able to communicate with others 
except 40.0.0.0., the list will be placed on FastEthernet 0/1 of Router 2 (R2) despite being 
connected to 40.0.0.0. 
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GRAPH 1 Packet Tracer RIP Topology 
 
R2>enable 
R2#configure terminal 
Enter configuration commands, one per line.  End with CNTL/Z. 
R2(config)#access-list 1 deny 10.0.0.3 0.0.0.0 
R2(config)#access-list 1 permit any 
R2(config)#interface fastEthernet 0/1 
R2(config-if)#ip access-group 1 out 
 
As seen above in the commands, the router is configured and the list is applied to match 
every device in the network. In order to test, ping from 10.0.0.3 to 40.0.0.3.  As the packet 
is filtered by the ACL, it requests time out. Nevertheless, pinging 30.0.0.3 is successful as 
shown below. 
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PC>ping 40.0.0.3 
Pinging 40.0.0.3 with 32 bytes of data: 
Request timed out. 
Request timed out. 
Request timed out. 
Request timed out. 
 
Ping statistics for 40.0.0.3: 
    Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 0, Lost = 4 (100% loss), 
 
PC>ping 30.0.0.3 
 
Pinging 30.0.0.3 with 32 bytes of data: 
 
Request timed out. 
Reply from 30.0.0.3: bytes=32 time=140ms TTL=126 
Reply from 30.0.0.3: bytes=32 time=156ms TTL=126 
Reply from 30.0.0.3: bytes=32 time=112ms TTL=126 
 
Ping statistics for 30.0.0.3: 
    Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 3, Lost = 1 (25% loss), 
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds: 
    Minimum = 112ms, Maximum = 156ms, Average = 136ms 
 
 
Just as the list is applied to a specific host, other networks connected to 10.0.0.0 should be  
able to connect to 40.0.0.0 network. This will be tried by pinging from 10.0.0.2 to 40.0.0.3. 
The result is as shown below. 
 
PC>ipconfig 
 
IP Address......................: 10.0.0.2 
Subnet Mask.....................: 255.0.0.0 
Default Gateway.................: 10.0.0.1 
 
PC>ping 40.0.0.3 
 
Pinging 40.0.0.3 with 32 bytes of data: 
 
Request timed out. 
Reply from 40.0.0.3: bytes=32 time=141ms TTL=126 
Reply from 40.0.0.3: bytes=32 time=140ms TTL=126 
Reply from 40.0.0.3: bytes=32 time=125ms TTL=126 
 
Ping statistics for 40.0.0.3: 
    Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 3, Lost = 1 (25% loss), 
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds: 
    Minimum = 125ms, Maximum = 141ms, Average = 135ms 
 
 
 
In order to match everyone and anyone, the following list is implemented. 
 
access-list 1 permit any 
 
Or 
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access-list 1 permit 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 
 
A good example of where a packet filter fails is with the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). The 
FTP protocol requires a dynamic high TCP port opened back to the server. Since a packet 
filter does not understand protocols, it would have to have all TCP high ports opened back 
to the server to support the FTP protocol. Any protocol that uses dynamic ports would re-
quire all the ports opened through a packet-filtering firewall. (Stiefel, Stephens & Watkins 
2005, 5.) 
 
Packet filtering comes with a few advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include 
compatibility, which allows the packet filters to work with any protocol as far as the packet 
stream is not altered by the packet filters. So also is Performance whereby the packet filters 
work swiftly since they only depend on headers. Lastly is Scalability. This is due to the 
simplicity of the packet filters. Disadvantages include low security whereby the packet filters 
ignore the data portion through which attacks can come through. Furthermore, there is a lack 
of support for dynamic protocols because the filters do not keep track of connections.  In all 
it is advisable not to depend solely on packet filtering as firewalls because attacks can pass 
through them easily. (Danielyan 2002.) 
 
CheckPoint VPN-1/Firewall-1 is a new generation firewall Solution that analyzes traffic 
through Stateful inspection. This technology stores and allows all traffic to be checked and 
manipulated as they pass through the firewall. This gives traffic a more robust protection 
whilst taking into account high performance, application awareness, security, transparency 
and extensibility.VPN-1 is a Stateful firewall which filters traffic by inspecting the applica-
tion layer. It is designed to prevent unauthorized access to data to or from the networks 
linked with the firewall. Firewall-1 is usually considered the same but in fact, both have 
different functions. (Simonis 2002, 5.) 
 
 According to Noble, Maxwell, Hourihan, Stephens, Stiefel, Amon & Tobkin (2003), Fire-
Wall-1 provides the data filtering, logging, and access control as expected of any firewall 
gateway. VPN-1 integrates tightly into FireWall-1 to add virtual private networking tools 
alongside the firewall. Combining VPN-1 with FireWall-1 has allowed Check Point to pro-
vide firewall and VPN products that not only leverage each other’s strengths, but  
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Check Point provides, in the NG suite, the tools required to manage VPN1/FireWall-1 in a 
distributed environment, allowing security managers to define and enforce a single Security 
Policy across the entire enterprise. (Simonis 2002, 5.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
3 CHECKPOINT 
 
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd is a pioneer in securing the Internet. It is a market 
pioneer in enterprise firewall, personal firewall and VPN markets. Check Point Software 
Technologies sets up a perimeter around networks. It provides security tools and devices for 
large networks and service providers. Check Point's products verify remote users, incoming 
traffic alongside virus protection. Its products enable companies to set up virtual private 
networks (VPNs) for secure internal and remote connections, alongside devices for band-
width management, network performance, and availability applications. (Checkpoint 2009.) 
 
The Check Point Next Generation (NG) Suite is composed of several different products bun-
dled to create a complete enterprise security solution. The combination of these specialized 
tools allows the NG suite to address the major security and network management challenges 
facing today’s security managers. Rather than look at network security solely from the fire-
wall or Virtual Private Network (VPN) solution, Check Point set out with its Secure Virtual 
Network (SVN) architecture, to encompass all areas of Enterprise security into a single, 
easy-to-use product offering. Until recently, many enterprise security managers believed that 
simply firewalling their network at the Internet connection provided all the security they 
needed. In today’s network world, there are Intra and Extranet connections to secure, not to 
mention remote dial and VPN access to worry about. The SVN architecture looks at the 
entire enterprise network, encompassing not only Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide 
Area Network (WAN) connections, but extending right down to the individual VPN con-
nected user. This new enterprise level view of security defines a complete, scalable, and 
secure architecture that requires the integration of several products to achieve. (Noble et al. 
2003, 3.) According to Morrissey (1998), CheckPoint Software Technologies Router Man-
agement Module, available with its Firewall-1 product allows the central management of the 
configuration of access list on Bay, Cisco, and 3Com Routers via GUI.  
 
 
3.1 CheckPoint NGX 
 
Checkpoint NGX supports varied number of encryption algorithms such as Digital Encryp-
tion Standard (DES), Triple Digital Encryption Standard (3DES), Advanced Encryption 
Standard -128 bit key (AES-128), Advanced Encryption Standard -256 bit key (AES-256), 
and finally Cast Encryption. VPN-1 primarily uses the traditional and simplified approach 
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to configure Virtual Private Networks (VPN) between sites. The traditional method requires 
configuring the access rules, which specify what traffic should be encrypted. The simplified 
method requires the specification of the devices, which should have their communication 
encrypted. Setting up VPN between sites using these methods is quite easy. Selection of the 
desired approach can be made easily by going through Policy - global properties – VPN, as 
shown in Graph 2. ( Stiefel, Stephens & Watkins 2005.)  
 
 
GRAPH 2. VPN Configuration Method Selection (Stiefel et al. 2005, 367). 
 
According to Bonnell & Desmeules (2008), there have been significant improvements in 
VPN functionality with the new addition of SecurePlatform pro, which offers dynamic rout-
ing and support for remote authentication Dial-in User service (RADIUS) for enterprise se-
curity solution managers. The product is available to larger organizations interested in in-
corporating the router in their Checkpoint firewalls into their current dynamic routing con-
figuration. 
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3.2 Firewall Modes 
 
Check Point firewalls can be utilized as a part of any possible DMZ setup, including the 
conventional "three-legged" configuration, a multi-DMZ setup, and the dual-firewall "sand-
wich" or "back-to-back" design, where separate firewalls shield the external and internal 
networks from one another (Flynn 2006 321.) Graph 3 illustrates a typical “three-legged 
firewall design” having SmartConsole and SmartCenter separate from the gateway. The 
SmartCenter server is located in the DMZ but could serve the same purpose even if located 
inside the LAN. Essence of the SmartCenter in the DMZ is to allow the user use the 
SmartConsole GUI in the internal LAN to manage other firewalls located on external, Inter-
nal or third party networks. When limited to managing firewalls on the local network, it 
would be more useful placed on the internal LAN. This ensures extra security since it cannot 
be accessed by unknown networks. (Flynn, 2006.)  
 
 
 
GRAPH 3. “Three-legged” firewall with distributed CheckPoint Architecture (Flynn 2006, 
322). 
 
“Sandwich” or “Back-to-Back” combines two firewalls to separate internal resources from 
external resources, which could be accessed from outside the infrastructure. The two fire-
walls serve to boost up security at the gateway. The primary disadvantage to the three-legged 
firewall is the additional complexity. Access to and from the DMZ and to and from the in-
ternal network is controlled by one large set of rules. This is illustrated in Graph 4. 
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GRAPH 4. “Sandwich” or “Back-to-Back” firewall with distributed CheckPoint architecture 
(Flynn 2006, 323). 
 
Performance test results using curl loader, an open source tool, indicates, as shown in Table 
2, describes the various performance levels for various firewalls. The results were arrived at 
using Key Performance Indicators (KPI). Test were performed on Cisco ASA, CheckPoint 
SPLAT and OpenBSD PF. The results show CheckPoint firewall as most suitable for large 
networks alongside greater functionality. (Chirag & Thakker 2011.) 
 
TABLE 2. Performance Test Results (Chirag 2011). 
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3.3 SecuRemote and SecureClient as Gateway tools 
 
SecuRemote and SecureClient are great tools provided by Checkpoint for VPN remote con-
nections. Both make use of AES-128 and AES-256 encryption alongside SmartDashboard, 
which add new functionality with dual routing rules to the SecureClient Device. Ultimately, 
this enables applications to connect to VPN hosts through existing encrypted tunnels. Both 
tools also support rapid and fixed IP addressing for all ISP’s such as dial-up, cable, and 
digital subscriber lines DSL. All VPN functionality, including key negotiation and data en-
cryption, is very meaningful to the client. Every time a user requests a connection, VPN-1 
SecuRemote/SecureClient intercepts the request and figures out whether the destination re-
source is linked to a known VPN-1 gateway as illustrated in the diagram below. Once iden-
tified, the VPN-1 client is instantly invoked and authentication is requested. (Stiefel 2005.) 
VPN-1 SecuRemote/SecureClient likewise resolves both internal unregistered domains and 
external domain names. This described in Graph 5. 
 
 
GRAPH 5. Secure VPN Connectivity (Checkpoint 2009). 
 
3.3.1 SecuRemote  
 
SecuRemote is Check Point's VPN-1 Client item. It is a specialist tool located on the cus-
tomer machine, allowing encrypted secure access to an organization's private network. It 
makes use of an easy to use Graphical User Interface (GUI) VPN customer. It uses the IKE 
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(ISAKMP) key exchange protocol to set up an encoded passage between the desktop ma-
chine and the VPN-1 Firewall gateway thereby enabling desktops to be connected to any 
internet connection and allowing users to safely access an organizations internal network 
resources like email and internal web applications. (Stiefel et al. 2005, 399.)  
 
Features in the CheckPoint NGX SecuRemote include NAT-T Support, which conforms to 
the industry standard Network Address Translation (NAT) transversal. Office Mode, which 
is utilized to allow access to other gateways within the private network using an assigned 
address and Multiple Entry Point MEP, which centralizes a connection profile by providing 
a backup gateway irrespective of a MEP decision. General Connectivity in terms of encryp-
tion domains are now specified from site to site VPN and for remote access VPN. (Stiefel et 
al. 2005, 399.) 
 
 
 
3.3.2 SecureClient 
 
SecureClient takes into account increased desktop security. As an enterprise, it is essential 
to guarantee that the mobile workforce has access to data to and from the organization's 
private network. Nonetheless, once data is downloaded to a client's portable PC or remote 
machine, the information is helpless against attack. Upon connecting to the VPN-1 gateway, 
SecureClient downloads the most recent, applicable Desktop Security policy and enforces it 
on the end user’s machine. SecureClient are located at the kernel level, inspecting all net-
work traffic to and from the machine to protect the end user from malicious traffic and at-
tacks. This way it protects the end user from attacks as well as the internal network. (Stiefel 
et al. 2005, 429.)  
 
New features of the CheckPoint SecureClient include Policy Expiration, which happens after 
connection. SecureClient attempts to download and update the policy in half the expiration 
time. If unsuccessful, it does not revert to the default policy. As will be discussed later during 
the installation process, there is not much difference between the installation of SecuRemote 
and SecureClient. Preferences can be made by selection when installing the package. (Stiefel 
et al. 2005, 429.) 
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3.4 System Requirements 
 
CheckPoint earliest releases defines a list of minimum requirements as shown in Table 3 
below. Current versions, which include Checkpoint Splat, R65, R70 and R77, come with 
added features and have updated system requirements. Clients can upgrade from the older 
versions to the newer ones with ease. Table 4 & 5 describe the latest requirements by plat-
form basis. 
 
For Windows platform, Ultimate, Professional and Enterprise Editions are supported by 
Windows 7 while for Windows 8, it is true for Professional and Enterprise editions only. 
Just as indicated below, all the marked consoles and platforms are true for 32-bit and 64-bit, 
unless shown otherwise. (Checkpoint Software Technologies Ltd. 2016.) 
 
 
TABLE 3. Minimum System Requirements (Amon et al. 2002). 
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Below (TABLE 4), is the requirements by Windows platform for current Checkpoint prod-
ucts. From Windows Vista 32-bit to Windows 8, all products are supported except for Se-
cureClient that supports only 32-bit platform for Windows 7. 
 
TABLE 4. Clients by windows platform (Checkpoint Software Technologies Ltd. 2016). 
 
 
 
Table 5 below shows the current requirements by Mac platform. Products like Identity 
Agent, Endpoint Security VPN E75 and Endpoint Security client E80 retain similar config-
uration requirements for Mac OS. SecureClient requires 32-bit for both Mac OS X 10.6 and 
Mac OS X 10.7. It does not support Mac OS X 10.8. 
 
TABLE 5. Clients by Mac Platform (Checkpoint Software Technologies Ltd. 2016). 
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4 INSTALLING CHECKPOINT NGX 
 
CheckPoint NGX can be installed in two ways namely, distributed installation, which re-
quires the separation of the SmartCenter server (management server) from the Firewall-
1/VPN-1 gateway. The other type of installation is the Stand Alone installation. Here, the 
security management server (SmartCenter) and the security gateway are installed on the 
same computer or appliance. For distributed deployment, the gateway allows or rejects traf-
fic based on security policies, user databases, logs, objects and so on that it receives from 
the SmartCenter. (Shinder, Amon & Shimonski 2007, 2.) 
 
Rather than go through with the installation of CheckPoint NGX in a distributed environment 
with its entire component products, emphasis will be placed more on installation and con-
figuration procedures for VPN-1/Firewall-1 NG. Before installation, it is important to 
strengthen the current operating system. This is to ensure that the OS is not running unwanted 
services that could leave the gateway open to risk. Ping the remote devices from the OS that 
will host the CheckPoint installation to make sure packets are forwarded to the right desti-
nations. (Stiefel et al. 2005, 47.) 
 
4.1 SecurePlatform 
 
This is installed first from CheckPoint media kit. It requires Intel or AMD based systems 
with CD-ROM. First step involves inserting the NGX CD1 and rebooting the system. After 
reboot, a welcome screen appears, prompting the user to press enter to commence installation 
as shown in Graph 6 below. 
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 GRAPH 6. SecurePlatform Welcome Screen (Stiefel et al. 2005, 47). 
 
As indicated on the welcome screen, if no key pressed within ninety seconds, the installation 
aborts without affecting the system. This applies also when “cancel” is selected in the next 
screen. The device list shows hardware devices detected by SecurePlatform. Compatibility 
of connected hardware is important in order not to cause problems later. To add a hardware 
device, select Add Driver. This action prompts a selection for the path to the new driver. 
Select OK to continue the installation, as shown in Graph 7. 
 
 
GRAPH 7. Options in welcome screen (Stiefel et al. 2005, 48). 
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Next, the “System Type” screen comes on (GRAPH 8). Simply select SecurePlatform and 
press OK. This pops a screen prompting selection of keyboard type, depending on the region 
of the gateway as shown below (GRAPH 9). Click OK to continue to language selection. 
 
 
GRAPH 8. System Type (Stiefel et al. 2005, 49). 
 
The keyboard type is not optional, meaning that selecting any type because it suits the user 
more, would cause an error eventually in the installation. It is mandatory to select the type 
of keyboard attached to the computer based on the region detected. Notwithstanding this, 
language selection is optional. 
 
 
GRAPH 9. Keyboard Selection (Stiefel et al. 2005, 50). 
 
Graph 10, which comes next, displays the Network Interface Cards (NIC) attached to the 
system. The screen also indicates a Link, No Link, or Unknown, if the interface does not 
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support Secure Platform’s link detection protocol. It is recommended for initial installation 
of FireWall-1/VPN-1, to be on the interface that is facing the Internet, as this will be auto-
matically listed in the operating system host’s file. Select the external interface and then 
select OK to continue. 
 
 
GRAPH 10. Network Device (Stiefel et al. 2005, 50). 
 
As shown in Graph 11, which comes next, it is required to use routable internet protocol 
addressing provided by the ISP in use, but for installation instruction purposes, private ad-
dressing is used. Note that the internet protocol addressing used here is a sample for instal-
lation instructions only. Select ok to continue after the configuration. 
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GRAPH 11. Network Interface Configuration (Stiefel et al. 2005, 51). 
 
SecurePlatform has a distinct feature, which allows it to configure the OS directly from a 
web-based browser like Internet Explorer. Graph 12 displays the HTTPS server configura-
tion screen prompting the user to enable web-based configuration or not and which port it 
should be listed on. By default, it is enabled but it may be better to change the default HTTPS 
sockets port 443 to another port. Click OK to continue after configuration. 
 
 
GRAPH 12. HTTPS Server Configuration (Stiefel et al. 2005, 52). 
 
Following this process is the confirmation screen (GRAPH 13). Selecting ok commences the 
disk format process, which allows CheckPoint SecurePlatform to install a pre-hardened OS 
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in minutes. Stopping the formatting process is impossible unless the computer is switched 
off. This is not advisable since it may cause unwanted issues. 
 
 
GRAPH 13. Confirmation (Stiefel et al. 2005, 52). 
 
After completion, pressing OK ejects the CD and reboots the system. A login screen request-
ing username and password follows this. By default, the username and password are both 
admin.  (Stiefel et al. 2005, 53.)  
 
 
GRAPH 14. Complete Check Point SecurePlatform Installation (Stiefel et al. 2005, 53). 
 
The installation can be completed via the command line (using serial connections, ssh con-
nection, or keyboard and monitor) or via a web browser. The simplest being via a Web User 
27 
 
Interface (WebUI). Open the browser and connect to https://<IP address used during instal-
lation>. It opens up a license agreement prompting you to accept. After this comes the login 
screen where you use the default username and password. A new screen will appear request-
ing you change the password. (Stiefel et al. 2005, 55.) On completion of this, log into secure 
platform either by the website or by using the sysconfig utility provided as in the graph 
below. 
 
 
GRAPH 15. Welcome wizard (Stiefel et al. 2005, 55). 
 
Selecting the option for next produces a screen where all the components required for con-
figuration is required for selection. Each option comes with its own configuration screens to 
enable the user properly configure the components. Be sure to select all the components by 
going through their configuration screens. This is shown in Graph 16. 
 
 
 GRAPH 16. Initial Configuration screen (Stiefel et al 2005, 55). 
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4.2 FireWall-1/VPN-1 Installation 
 
From the welcome screen, make sure the license agreement is read and accepted. This 
prompts the next screen, (GRAPH 17), where by a selection must be made between Enter-
prise and Express. The difference being the number of IPs that can be protected. Express is 
smaller with less than 500 IPs, which makes it more suitable for medium sized businesses. 
Select “1” and click on “next” to starts the installation of the Enterprise/Pro product. (Stiefel 
et al. 2005, 57.) 
 
 
GRAPH 17. Enterprise/Express Selection (Stiefel et al. 2005, 57). 
 
Selecting Enterprise prompts a screen (GRAPH 18) that asks which products to install. Since 
a distributed architecture is needed, select VPN-1 Pro. This action also automatically installs 
FireWall-1 because both products are now merged. 
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GRAPH 18. Select Products (Stiefel et al. 2005, 57). 
 
A validation screen pops up anytime a product is selected. In case of any errors, one can 
always go back to the selection screen. OS questions regarding whether or not the gateway 
has a Dynamically Assigned IP (DAIP) address and if there is a ready installed clustering 
product like ClusterXl, pop up on the next screen after confirmation. Select yes for both 
because Check Point supports DAIP in order to create a certificate to send to the SmartCenter 
Server for management, logging and VPN services. At the same time, it will disable IP for-
warding, harden the OS security and generate the default filter for the gateway. The default 
filter being a “drop all” rule with the exception of some CheckPoint communication proto-
cols. These are done after reboot. (Stiefel et al. 2005, 59.) 
 
After completion of the installation, configure the product after the prompt. Installing a li-
cense could be done at the same time, though easier through SmartUpdate. Also important 
in the configuration of a distributed installation is the SIC, an activation key which is a one-
time pass phrase that must be entered in any CheckPoint product installation. This is done 
by entering the pass phrase when prompted, install the policies and send. Once through, a 
prompt will suggest a reboot for server as illustrated in Graph 19 below. 
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GRAPH 19. Product Configuration (Stiefel et al. 2005, 60). 
 
4.3 SmartCenter Server Installation 
 
This is the most crucial system in all Check Point FireWall-1 configuration especially in a 
distributed environment. Notwithstanding the type of deployment, standalone or distributed, 
all FireWall-1 comes with a SmartCenter Server. The server handles important functions of 
the firewall requirement point and gives all availability to the SMART Clients. It also pro-
vides connectivity and data to all SMART Client connections whilst storing enforcement 
point logs, enforcement point configuration, and every single other part of the firewall build-
ing design. This is illustrated in Graph 20 below. (Noble et al. 2003, 350.)  
 
GRAPH 20. Check Point Architecture (Noble et al. 2003, 350). 
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5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As technological innovations change for the better, its overall effect changes the way people 
work, live, play and even share information. Network firewalls are designed to protect a 
trusted network from an untrusted one. This is achieved through packet filtering with regard 
to special security policies. ACLs as a form of firewall contains sets of rules that are multi-
dimensional, that is, containing source addresses, destination addresses and ports. The more 
complex the rule sets are, the less effective they become concerning large organizations. 
Although different firewalls are deployed in various markets, there is still no standard eval-
uation process for comparison, which is due largely to different implementation methods per 
organization.  
 
The cur loader test as discussed in Chapter three, replicated behavior of http/https clients 
using their unique IP addresses. The results from the test are indicative of the fact that Cisco 
ASA gives better performance while Checkpoint SPLAT’s functionality is unparalleled. It 
provides better firewall and centralized policy management an alongside a great user inter-
face than the rest. This uniquely makes it stand out and definitely more suitable for complex 
networks. 
 
As a firewall, Checkpoint is important because Stateful inspection allows for a deeper scru-
tiny or filtering unlike in ACLs. This mostly because ACLs found on routers, filter packets 
based on information given in the command. Moreover, Checkpoint firewalls, which per-
form Stateful inspection, also scrutinize the packets payload alongside the application pro-
tocol.  
 
Every three to four years CheckPoint upgrades its products to suit the rising needs of the 
dynamic network industry. Some of its latest products and the year of release include the 
CheckPoint NGX R65 (2007-2009), R70 (2009-2011), R75 (2011-2013).  Most of the cur-
rent versions come with new features such as SmartDefense (IPS), Quality of Service 
(Floodgate-1) and Content Inspection. 
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